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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
ROCKLAND COUNTY DISTRICT ATTORNEY'S 
CRIMINAL INVESTIGATOR'S ASSOCIATION, 
Petitioner, 
- a n d - CASE NO. CP-720 
COUNTY OF ROCKLAND, 
Employer. 
JOHN K. GRANT, ESQ, for Petitioner 
PATRICIA ZUGIBE, COUNTY ATTORNEY (JEFFREY J. FORTUNATO of 
counsel), for Employer 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to us on exceptions filed by the Rockland County District 
Attorney's Criminal Investigator's Association (Association) to a decision of an 
Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) dismissing its unit clarification/unit placement petition 
which sought a determination that the newly-created title of undercover unit supervisor 
is, or should be, included in the unit it represents of criminal investigators employed by 
the District Attorney's Office of the County of Rockland (County). 
The ALJ limited the record to the parties' pleadings and correspondence 
clarifying the relevant facts, after she determined that no hearing was necessary on the 
threshold issue of whether employees who were not eligible for interest arbitration 
pursuant to §209.4 of the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act (Act) were properly 
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included in a unit of employees who were subject to that provision of the Act. The ALJ 
instructed the parties to brief the issue and, after receipt of the parties' briefs, issued a 
decision that dismissed both the unit clarification and unit placement aspects of the 
Association's petition. 
Finding that the title of undercover unit supervisor was not listed in the parties' 
contractual recognition clause and not included in the unit, the ALJ dismissed the unit 
clarification aspect of the petition. Determining that the at-issue title was not included in 
§209.4 of the Act among those titles employed in a county district attorney's office 
eligible for compulsory interest arbitration, the ALJ determined that the title was not 
eligible for interest arbitration and could not be placed in the unit represented by the 
Association, as all the titles already in the unit were eligible for interest arbitration 
pursuant to §209.4 of the Act. 
EXCEPTIONS 
The Association excepts to the ALJ's decision, arguing that it was entitled to a 
hearing even on the limited, threshold, issue addressed in the ALJ's decision. Arguing 
that the ALJ erred in determining that the at-issue title was not included in its unit 
because the duties of the undercover unit supervisor are identical or substantially 
similar to the duties of unit titles, the Association asserted that the unit clarification 
portion of its petition should have been granted. The Association further argued that the 
title of undercover unit supervisor is eligible for compulsory interest arbitration or, even 
if not so eligible, is nonetheless appropriately placed in its unit because the unit already 
includes a title, child abuse investigator, that is not eligible for interest arbitration. 
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Finally, the Association argues that the ALJ erred in determining that a hearing was not 
necessary. The County supports the ALJ's decision. 
FACTS 
In 1983, the Board certified the Association as the exclusive bargaining 
representative of a unit of employees in the titles of criminal investigator, senior criminal 
investigator and criminal investigator-electronic surveillance.1 The provisions of the 
parties' collective bargaining agreement now define the unit as including the titles of 
child abuse investigator, criminal investigators, senior criminal investigators and 
confidential criminal investigator.2 The position of child abuse investigator is currently 
vacant and the County alleges in its pleadings that the title was abolished in 1991. The 
Association does not dispute the County's assertion, although it refers to the position as 
"allegedly" abolished, relying on the continued inclusion of the title in the recognition 
clause. 
By virtue of the enactment of Chapter 485 of the Laws of 1990 and Chapter 723 
of the Laws of 1991, the titles of detective-investigator and criminal investigator, 
respectively, were included in §209.4 of the Act, which provides the named titles with 
eligibility for the compulsory interest arbitration procedures set forth in §209 of the Act. 
The Association asserts that the duties of the at-issue title of undercover unit 
supervisor are identical or substantially similar to the duties of the criminal investigators 
2The parties' memorandum of understanding extending the term of their 
January 1, 1996 to December 31, 1998 collective bargaining agreement for the period 
January 1, 1999 to December 30, 2002, did not alter the recognition clause or the titles 
included therein. 
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within its unit. In dismissing the petition, the ALJ did not make a determination as to the 
duties actually performed by the undercover unit supervisor. 
DISCUSSION 
In our recent decision in State of New York,3 we emphasized that titles which do 
not have the same dispute resolution procedures are not appropriately placed in the 
same unit.4 Here, there is no dispute that the undercover unit supervisor is not a title 
listed in §209.4 of the Act which is eligible for interest arbitration. As was noted in an 
earlier decision involving these parties: 
[t]he amendments which extended the applicability of §209.4 
[of the Act] to certain employees in a district attorney's office 
did not do so generically, e.g., investigative employees or, 
arguably, investigators, but by specific titles, i.e., 
detective-investigators (L. 1990, c. 485) and criminal 
investigators (L. 1991, c. 723). PERB's "no position" 
recommendation on the 1990 amendment characterized the 
amendment as including "detective-investigators" among the 
"classifications" entitled to interest arbitration and the 
sponsor's memorandum for the Assembly bill (1326-A) 
which became the 1991 amendment referenced coverage of 
the "title" of detective-investigator. The above factors 
bespeak the legislature's intent to extend the coverage 
under §209.4 of the Act based on titles rather than 
functions.5 
Turning to the specifics of the ALJ's analysis, we find that the ALJ correctly 
dismissed the unit clarification aspect of the petition because the at-issue title is not one 
334 PERB 1(3038, at 3093 n.22 (2001). 
4See also City of Lockport, 30 PERB 1(3049 (1997). 
) 5County of Rockland, 32 PERB 1(4017, at 4043, aff'd, 32 PERB 1f3074 (1999), 
confirmed, 34 PERB 1(7019 (Sup. Ct. Albany County 2001). 
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of the titles listed in the recognition clause of the parties' collective bargaining 
agreement.6 
The Association also argued that the unit clarification petition should be granted 
because the undercover unit supervisor is included in its unit because of an identity or 
similarity with the investigative titles in the unit. Addressing this argument, the ALJ, 
relying on our holding in Rye City School District,7 took into account the scope of the 
existing unit, which allows for the consideration of other factors, such as community of 
interest. Given the disparate dispute resolution procedures enjoyed by the criminal 
investigators as opposed to the undercover unit supervisor, the ALJ found essentially 
that there was no community of interest because there was no "substantial similarity" 
between the two titles, regardless of whatever else the titles might share. Finding that 
there was a fundamental dissimilarity between the unit titles and the undercover unit 
supervisor based upon their eligibility, or lack thereof, for interest arbitration, the ALJ 
correctly found the Association's alternate argument in support of the unit clarification 
aspect of the petition to be without merit. 
The Association's reliance on the initial uniting decision creating the unit of 
criminal investigators in the district attorney's office is misplaced. While the initial unit 
was created based upon the "police duties" performed by the criminal investigators in 
the district attorney's office, as we have noted, ensuing legislation granted eligibility for 
^County of Orange and Sheriff of Orange County, 25 PERB 1J3049 (1992), 
confirmed sub nom. Orange County Deputy Sheriffs Ass'n v. PERB, 26 PERB 1J7004 
(Sup. Ct. Rockland County 1993). 
733 PERB 1J3053 (2000). 
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interest arbitration to the titles of criminal investigator and detective-investigator. Any. 
subsequent decisions regarding the makeup of that unit must take into account the 
dispute resolution procedures applicable to the titles in the unit and applicable to any 
titles that are proposed for inclusion in the unit.8 
Turning to the unit placement portion of the petition, the ALJ properly relied on 
earlier Board decisions which recognized the inappropriateness of combining titles that 
are not entitled to compulsory interest arbitration with titles that are eligible for interest 
arbitration.9 As we have previously found, the "most appropriate unit" cannot include 
titles that are subject to different dispute resolution procedures.10 
Finally, we deny the Association's exception to the ALJ's determination that no 
hearing would be held on the unit clarification aspect of the petition. A hearing is not 
required in a representation proceeding; the investigation required by §201.9 of the 
Rules may be conducted on the pleadings and such additional submissions as directed 
by the Director of Public Employment Practices and Representation or the assigned 
ALJ.11 The ALJ has the authority in the processing of any improper practice charge or 
representation case to limit the record to the facts relevant to the issues presented in 
8County of Rockland, supra note 5. 
9<~> r\:±.. ~r i ( i _ . ^ A_ A O _ ; i / : i / _x rw „•»_/ A d nr—no 
oee \j\iy ui L.vui\pun, nupid nuits *+. o e e ctmu vmaytf ui ottc*//t?cfie/«o, I U rn.r\o 
113070(1983). 
10See State of New York, supra; City of Lockport, id. 
"Bethpage Union Free Sch. Dist, 15 PERB 1J3094 (1982). 
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the case and to determine that there are no relevant facts in dispute that warrant a 
hearing.12 
Based upon the foregoing, the decision of the ALJ is affirmed. Accordingly, the 
petition is dismissed in its entirety. SO ORDERED. 
DATED: February 28, 2002 
Albany, New York 
Mjoffeel R. Cuevas, Chairman 
i> 
n T. Mitchell, Member 
^Comsewogue Union Free Sch. Dist, 15 PERB 1(3018 (1982). See also Village 
of Belmont, 34 PERB 1J3008 (2001); Board ofEduc. of the City Sch. Dist. of City of New 
York, 16 PERB 1J3048 (1983). 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
BEAVER RIVER CENTRAL SCHOOL DISTRICT 
NON-INSTRUCTIONAL EMPLOYEES 
ASSOCIATION/NYSUT/AFT/AFL-CIO, 
Petitioner, 
- and - CASE NO. C-5140 
BEAVER RIVER CENTRAL SCHOOL DISTRICT, 
Employer. 
SHEILA F. PATTERSON, for Petitioner 
TRACY R. SCHOLZ, for Employer 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
On November 7, 2001, the Director of Public Employment Practices and 
Representation (Director) determined that the Beaver River Central School District 
Non-Instructional Employees Association/NYSUT/AFT/AFL-CIO (Association) was 
eligible pursuant to §201.9(g)(1) of our Rules of Procedure (Rules) for certification 
without an election as the representative of the bargaining unit of certain employees of 
the Beaver River Central School District (District). 
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By order of the Board, dated December 6, 2001, the matter was remanded to 
the Director for further investigation.1 
This matter comes to us on exceptions filed by the District to the Director's 
subsequent decision, dated January 11, 2002, in which he determined, after 
conducting an investigationrthat the Association was^eligible for certification-without— 
an election. 
EXCEPTIONS 
The District excepts to the Director's decision principally on the grounds that the 
current membership list submitted by the Association is not conclusive proof of the 
employees' true interest in representation by the Association. The Association 
submitted its response to the District's exceptions, arguing that it had satisfied the 
requirements of §201.9(g)(1) of the Rules for certification without an election. 
DISCUSSION 
Part 201 of our Rules governs the determination of representation status under 
the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act (Act). Section 201.9(g)(1) delegates to 
the Director the responsibility of disposing of the questions concerning representation 
after an investigation or hearing. Specifically, §201.9(g)(1) authorizes the Director to 
determine whether employee support is sufficient for certification without an election. 
1See Beaver River Cent. Sch. Dist, 34 PERB P039 (2001). 
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An employee organization may be certified without an election if it establishes that a 
majority of the employees within the unit support the employee organization.2 
The District contends, in its exceptions, that a list of current members in the 
Association is inconclusive evidence of the employees' choice of a representative. 
We disagreev 
Although §201.9(g)(1) of the Rules describes two types of documentary 
evidence that are considered by the Board in a certification without an election 
decision, i.e., current dues deduction authorization cards or individual designation 
cards executed within six months of the Director's decision, the Board early 
determined that the identification of such evidence was descriptive of proofs of 
support that could be submitted and not prescriptive.3 The Act does not restrict the 
Board from accepting "other evidences", including current membership lists, of the 
employees' choice of bargaining unit representative, and the Board has done so 
repeatedly.4 
The Board initially remanded this matter to the Director for further investigation. 
Having completed the investigation, the Director determined that the Association had 
2Bethlehem Public Library, 23 PERB 1J3009 (1990). 
3Town oflslip, 8 PERB 1J3049 (1975). 
4Act, §207.2. See also Corinth Cent. Sch. Dist, 20 PERB fl4028 (1987), 
confirmed, 20 PERB 113000.23 (1987): Aravie Cent Sch. Dist, 20 PERB U4027 (1987), 
confirmed, 20 PERB ^3000.21 a (1987); County of Wayne, 15 PERB 1J4083 (1982), 
confirmed, 15 PERB ^3000.55 (1982) [membership lists held sufficient evidence of 
majority support to satisfy Rules, §201.9(g)(1)]. 
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submitted evidence that satisfied the criteria of §201.9(g)(1) of the Rules as 
interpreted and applied by the Board.5 We agree. 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the Beaver River Central School District Non-
Instructional Employees Association/NYSUT/AFT/AFL-CIO has been designated and 
selected-by^ majority o f the employees of the Beaver River Central School Districtrin 
the unit agreed upon by the parties and described below, as their exclusive 
representative for the purpose of collective negotiations and the settlement of 
grievances. 
Included: All full-time and part-time non-instructional employees, including, 
but not limited to: Elementary Office Secretary, Guidance Office 
Secretaries, Middle School Office/CSE Secretary, 
Transportation/High School Office Secretary, Teacher Aides, 1:1 
Aides, Playground Aides, Elementary Cafeteria Aide, Elementary 
Library Aide, High School Library/Learning Center Aide, High 
School Cafeteria/Study Hall Aide, Study Hall Aides, 
Playground/Bus Aide, High School Cafeteria/Study Hall/Laundry 
Aide, Kindergarten Aide, Bus Drivers, Teacher Aide/Clerical Aide, 
Playground/Bus Aide, Computer Coordinator, AV Coordinator, 
Nurses (full and part-time), Food Service Workers, Cook, Baker, 
Cashier/Food Service, Assistant Cook/Baker, Cleaners, 
Custodians, Mechanic, Custodian/Maintenance, 
Maintenance/Assistant Head Custodian and Head Mechanic. 
Excluded: Substitutes, Business Office Secretaries, Building/Grounds 
Supervisor, Food Service Manager. 
FURTHER, IT IS ORDERED that the above-named public employer shall 
negotiate collectively with the Beaver River Central School District Non-Instructional 
Employees Association/NYSUT/AFT/AFL-CIO. The duty to negotiate collectively 
5The Association submitted evidence that 50 of the 84 employees in the 
petitioned-for bargaining unit are members of the Association. 
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includes the mutual obligation to meet at reasonable times and confer in good faith with 
respect to wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment, or the 
negotiation of an agreement, or any question arising thereunder, and the execution of a 
written agreement incorporating any agreement reached if requested by either party. 
Suchr obligation doesnot compel eitherparty toragree to a proposahor require the 
making of a concession. 
DATED: February 28, 2002 
Albany, New York 
/pphael R. Cuayas, Chairman 
/ Marc A. Abbott, Member 
John T. Mitchell, Member 
) 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
NEWARK VALLEY CARDINAL BUS DRIVERS, 
NYSUT/AFT/AFL-CIO, LOCAL 4360 CASE NO. DR-090 
Upon a Petition for Declaratory Ruling 
BRADLEY J. OVER, for NEWARK VALLEY CARDINAL BUS DRIVERS, 
NYSUT/AFT/AFL-CIO, LOCAL 4360 
HOGAN & SARZYNSKI, LLP, (JAMES A. GREGORY of counsel) for/ 
NEWARK VALLEY CENTRAL SCHOOL DISTRICT 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to us on exceptions filed by the Newark Valley Central School 
District (District) to a decision of an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) on a petition for a 
declaratory ruling filed by the Newark Valley Cardinal Bus Drivers, NYSUT/AFT/AFL-
CIO, Local 4360 (NYSUT). The petition sought a determination as to the negotiability of 
a demand proposed by NYSUT during negotiations for a successor collective 
bargaining agreement with the District. NYSUT's demand is that "The District will 
reimburse the cost of fingerprinting for new hires as well as current employees who are 
required to provide fingerprints." The District's position is that the demand is 
nonmandatory. 
The case was submitted to the ALJ on a stipulated record. The ALJ determined 
that the demand was one which sought reimbursement for a unit employee for a fee or 
cost associated with the employee's position and was, therefore, a demand for 
compensation and mandatorily negotiable. 
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EXCEPTIONS 
The District excepts to the ALJ's decision, arguing that the demand is for a pre-
hire inducement and nonmandatory. The District further asserts that the demand deals 
with fees paid by nonunit members as well as unit members and is, therefore, 
nonmandatory and that NYSUT is attempting to negotiate for prospective employees 
whom it does not represent.1 Finally, the District argues that the ALJ erred by noting 
that the cost to the District for reimbursement of fingerprinting fees might be an 
allowable cost subject to State aid. NYSUT supports the ALJ's decision. 
Based upon our review of the record and our consideration of the parties' 
arguments, we reverse the decision of the ALJ. 
FACTS 
Section 305.30 of the NYS Education Law and §509-d(2) of the NYS Vehicle and 
Traffic Law provide that school bus drivers must be fingerprinted to allow school 
districts to complete mandatory criminal background checks with Federal and New York 
State authorities. Because of the statutory mandate, the in-issue demand does not 
seek to negotiate the requirement that prospective employees or current employees be 
fingerprinted, it only seeks that reimbursement be paid to new employees for the costs 
attendant to the required tests. 
1As the parties' arguments focus on the demand as it relates to non-unit 
employees, we need not determine whether and to what extent the demand, if limited 
solely to reimbursement of current unit employees who may be fingerprinted for 
promotion or job retention, is mandatory. 
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DISCUSSION 
In State of New York,2 we held that a fee imposed by the State upon all 
applicants for competitive civil service examinations did not involve a mandatory subject 
of negotiations because it was applicable to the public at large and not just unit 
employees. Here, fingerprinting of all job applicants is mandated by State law and the 
fee is paid by all applicants, whether or not they subsequently are hired by the District. 
As such, the cost of the fingerprinting is like the cost for civil service examinations: a 
pre-employment expense applicable to the public at large. 
The cases relied upon by the ALJ are distinguishable. They relate to post-
employment "[cjompensation for satisfactory performance in a job [which] is a term and 
condition of employment."3 While we have held that a bargaining agent may negotiate 
for compensation for prospective and new unit employees,4 or reimbursement for 
expenses incurred by successful job applicants, those cases involved terms and 
conditions of employment of the unit employees once they became unit employees. In 
County of Tompkins, supra, for example, we found that reimbursement for moving 
expenses that was tied to successful completion of a year in the unit position was a 
mandatory subject of negotiation because it was "compensation not only for taking the 
job, but for also performing satisfactorily in it for one year."5 In City of Mount Vernon,6 
213PERB 1J3099 (1980). 
zCounty of Tompkins, 10 PERB p066 , at 3117-8 (1977). 
4Old Brookville Policemen's Benevolent Ass'n, Inc., 16 PERB 1J3094 (1983). 
6Supra, note 3 at 3117. 
618 PERB 1J3020 (1985). 
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we held that the City's imposition of a requirement that new employees reimburse the 
City for the cost of training them if they left the City's employ within three years was 
improper because it was not a qualification issue but a compensation issue. The City 
chose to train new employees after they became unit employees, not to require the 
training be.completed byJobLapplicants.prior toJheir^application for employment. We 
find that the instant demand, which is for reimbursement for a pre-employment 
expense, is not a term and condition of employment of unit employees. 
Because of our finding, we need not reach the other exceptions raised by the 
District. Based on the foregoing, we grant the District's exceptions and reverse the 
decision of the ALJ. 
DATED: February 28, 2002 
Albany, New York 
- - - w u ^ C r m* —s>» 
iael R. Cuevas, Chairman 
/L W 
Marc A. Abbott, Member 
John T. Mitchell, Member 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
SOUTH NYACK/GRAND VIEW JOINT POLICE 
ADMINISTRATION BOARD, CASE NO. DR-0102 
Upon a Petition for Declaratory Ruling 
DORIS F. ULMAN, ESQ., for Petitioner 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This matter comes to us on exceptions filed by the South Nyack/Grand View 
Joint Police Administration Board (Police Board) to the determination of the Director of 
Public Employment Practices and Representation (Director) that a declaratory ruling 
petition filed by the Police Board, which sought a determination regarding the 
negotiability of a demand of the Rockland County Patrolmen's Benevolent Association, 
Inc. (PBA) in its petition for compulsory interest arbitration, would be administratively 
closed.1 
FACTS 
On December 13, 2001, the PBA filed its petition for interest arbitration with the 
Public Employment Relations Board (Board). On December 24, 2001, the Police Board 
1While the Director's letter administratively closed the case, it was based upon a 
determination that the petition was deficient. We are, therefore, for the purposes of 
deciding the Police Board's exceptions, treating the Director's determination as a 
deficiency dismissal. 
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filed its petition for a declaratory ruling with the Director.2 On January 2, 2002, the 
Assistant Director of Public Employment Practices and Representation (Assistant 
Director) sent the Police Board a notice advising them that their petition was deficient 
for the reason that the "Petition is not 'on the form provided by the director' nor is it 
'sworn to' or otherwise in compliance with Section 210.1 of the [PERB's Rules of 
Procedure (Rules)]." 
On January 9, 2002, the Police Board filed an amended petition on the 
prescribed form sworn to by the attorney representing the Police Board. By letter dated 
January 14, 2002, the Assistant Director informed the Police Board that its amended 
petition: 
cannot amend the prior pleading as that was a nullity; it must be treated 
as a new filing. Assuming December 13, 2001, which is stated in 1J4 of 
the Petition as being the date of the at-issue demand, the Petition is 
untimely as not being in compliance with Section 205.6(c) of the Rules.3 
By letter dated January 31, 2002, the Director informed the Police Board that 
since he had not received a withdrawal letter, as instructed in the Assistant Director's 
letter of January 14, 2002, the matter was being administratively closed. 
On February 4, 2002, the Police Board filed its exceptions. 
2This petition was not drafted on the form prescribed by the Board and, thus, left 
out certain relevant facts. 
Notwithstanding the Assistant Director's determination, §205.6(c) of our Rules 
requires that a petition for declaratory ruling may not be filed after the date of the filing 
of the response to the petition for interest arbitration. The Police Board's January 9, 
2002 filing of the declaratory ruling petition on PERB's form was not, therefore, timely 
as it was not filed simultaneously with its response to the PBA's petition. 
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EXCEPTIONS 
The Police Board excepts to the Director's determination on the grounds that he 
erred on the law and specifically that its petition dated December 24, 2001, was timely 
and contained all the items set forth in PERB's Rules, §210.1. 
The PBA submitted its response that supported the Director's determination. 
DISCUSSION 
The Police Board argues that its petition dated December 24, 2001 was valid 
and timely and contained all items set forth in §210.1 of the Rules. Consequently, if we 
were to accept its argument, our inquiry would end. However, its argument is incorrect 
for the reasons hereinafter stated. 
Section 210.1(a) of the Rules specifies that the petition shall be in writing on a 
form provided by the director and shall be signed and sworn to before any person 
authorized to administer oaths. 
Part 210 was added on May 8, 1987. Effective that same 
date, §205.6(a) of the Rules was amended and a new 
subsection (c) was added to permit an objection to 
arbitrability to be raised not only by an improper practice 
charge but also by a declaratory ruling petition, but only if it 
were filed within ten working days after the receipt of the 
petition for interest arbitration or the response thereto.4 
That subsection also requires that, if filed by the respondent, a petition for declaratory 
ruling may not be filed after the date of the filing of the response to the petition for 
interest arbitration. 
4Fulton Firefighters Ass'n, Local 3063, IAFF, AFL-CIO, 29 PERB 1J6501, at 6502 
(1996). 
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As we held in Fulton Firefighters,5 
Two points are clear from the history and development of the cited Rules. 
The first is that declaratory ruling petitions have application and purpose 
apart from the interest arbitration context. The second is that although a 
declaratory ruling petition is a proper mechanism for raising an objection 
to arbitrability, if used for that purpose or to that effect, the filing must 
satisfy the specific requirements of Rule §205.6, not the general 
requirements of Part 210. 
The Police Board is essentially arguing that, by demanding the use of our form 
rather than its original petition, we have placed form over substance. To accept the 
Police Board's argument would require the Board to accept all filings in any form, so 
long as they contain sufficient information to determine their purpose. Our Rules require 
that petitions for declaratory rulings be on a form provided by the Director.6 Such forms 
require certain information which we have determined is necessary for the processing 
of such a petition. 
On the contrary, there are no prescribed forms for the petition for interest 
arbitration or the response to the interest arbitration petition.7 Where we have not 
specified that PERB forms be used, the parties are afforded some latitude in their 
pleadings. But, where our Rules require the use of our forms, we have strictly enforced 
those Rule requirements, especially when the pleading, such as the petition for 
declaratory ruling on a scope issue related to interest arbitration, commences the 
5ld. 
6Rules, §210.1 (a). 
7Rules, §205.4 and §205.5. 
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adjudicatory process.8 Our form requires specific information necessary to determine 
whether the petition has been timely filed in accordance with §205.6(c) of our Rules. 
If, as urged by the Police Board, we were to accept any filing proffered by a 
party, we would be required to review the filing to ascertain whether all of the required 
information was included, rather than to be presented with the information in an efficient 
and appropriate manner, as we are when the forms we have developed for that 
purpose are utilized. We have consistently rejected such arguments because such an 
interpretation of our Rules would render meaningless their expressed, unambiguous 
requirements that certain filings be on a form prescribed and/or provided by the Board.9 
The Police Board's response to the petition for interest arbitration and its original 
declaratory ruling petition were filed on December 24, 2001. Our Rules require that a 
respondent's petition for declaratory ruling may not be filed after its response to the 
petition for interest arbitration. The Police Board's initial filing of a request for 
declaratory ruling was a nullity as it was not on our form. Therefore, no subsequent 
filing of a declaratory ruling petition by the Police Board could be considered timely 
filed, as it would not have been filed simultaneously with its response to the petition for 
interest arbitration. Since the Police Board failed to observe our Rules in the first 
instance, the manner in which the Assistant Director and Director processed the Police 
Board's petition affords it no grounds for reversing the Director's determination to 
8See, e.g., V7//age of Highland Falls, 30 PERB ^6601 (1997). 
9See County of Broome (Sheriff's Dep't), 32 PERB 1J3054 (1999); Village of 
Highland Falls, supra; Jacob K. Javits Convention Ctr., 19 PERB fi3056 (1986). 
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administratively close the case.10 We have long held that we may not disregard our 
Rules and accept a petition which is not timely.11 
Based upon the foregoing, we deny the exceptions filed by the Police Board and 
affirm the determination of the Director. 
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDEREDLthat theLpetitionmust be, and.it hereby is, 
dismissed. 
DATED: February 28, 2002 
Albany, New York 
Michael R. Cuevas, Chairman 
Marc A.VCbbott, Member 
f 
\1 John T. Mitchell, Member 
10/d. 
11See Cattaraugus County Chapter of CSEA v. PERB, 3 PERB H7005 (Sup. Ct. 
Rensselaer County 1970). 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
NEW YORK CITY TRANSIT AUTHORITY, 
Charging Party, 
- and - CASE-NO. U-22997 
TRANSPORT WORKERS UNION OF GREATER 
NEW YORK, LOCAL 100, 
Respondent. 
RICHARD SCHOOLMAN, ESQ., for Charging Party 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This matter comes to us on exceptions to a decision of the Director of Public 
Employment Practices and Representation (Director) dismissing as deficient an 
improper practice charge filed by the New York City Transit Authority (Authority) 
alleging that the Transport Workers Union of Greater New York, Local 100 (TWU) 
violated §209-a.2(b) of the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act (Act) by repudiating 
a portion of the parties' current collective bargaining agreement. 
EXCEPTIONS 
The Authority excepts to the Director's decision on the grounds that he erred on 
the law by misapplying our prior holding in Local 589, International Association of 
Firefighters.^ 
124PERB 1J3022 (1991). 
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FACTS 
The relevant facts are set forth in the Director's decision.2 The Authority's 
improper practice charge alleges, inter alia, that the collective bargaining agreement 
contains a provision for broadbanding. This agreement was negotiated in 1999. In July 
2000, the Authority sub^ 
Services (DCAS) to consolidate several titles under the broadbanding provisions of the 
contract. The proposal was administratively approved. In January 2001, several 
individual Authority employees, who are members of TWU, commenced an Article 78 
proceeding in Supreme Court against DCAS, the Authority and TWU in an effort to void 
the broadbanding provision of the parties' collective bargaining agreement. 
On October 10, 2001, the TWU wrote to the judge assigned to the Article 78 
petition to explain its position that it believes the petition had merit for the reason that 
DCAS acted arbitrarily and, thereby, incorrectly by eliminating certain titles under the 
broadbanding concept. 
In addition to the improper practice charge, the Authority also filed an application 
for injunctive relief with PERB's counsel. On December 11, 2001, the Authority's 
application was also denied because it was found to be deficient. 
DISCUSSION 
The Authority argues that the position taken by the TWU in the Article 78 
proceeding over the issue of broadbanding contained in the collective bargaining 
agreement evidenced its repudiation of the entire agreement. We disagree. 
2TWU of Greater NY, Local 100, 35 PERB H4502 (2002). 
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When we have found a repudiation of an agreement, we have held it to be a 
violation of §209-a.1(d) or §209-a.2(b) of the Act. 
Our jurisdiction, however, is constrained by §205.5(d) of the Act which precludes 
the exercise of our jurisdiction in those situations in which a difference of opinion exists 
between the parties concerning the proper interpretation of their agreement, and also in 
those situations in which mere enforcement of the agreement is sought.3 The alleged 
denial of the existence of a valid agreement without any colorable claim of right is within 
our jurisdiction to consider, notwithstanding the limitations in §205.5(d) of the Act. 
It is apparent from the charge that the rights the Authority claims derive from the 
collective bargaining agreement. It is also apparent from the TWU correspondence, 
relied upon by the Director, that the TWU disputes the manner in which both the 
Authority and the DCAS have implemented the broadbanding provision contained in the 
parties' collective bargaining agreement. Nevertheless, TWU asserts that it derives its 
right from the collective bargaining agreement and it believes that it has a colorable 
claim to a contract action, which it has commenced against the Authority.4 As we held 
in Board of Education of the City School District of the City of Buffalo:5 
[W]e have distinguished a contract repudiation, which is cognizable as an 
improper practice, from a contract breach or contract enforcement, which 
is not. In making that distinction, we have emphasized that a meritorious 
repudiation claim arises only in "extraordinary circumstances" in which a 
party to the contract denies the existence of an agreement or acts in total 
disregard of the contract's terms without any colorable claim of right. 
3Connetquot Cent. Sch. Dist, 21 PERB 1J3049 (1988). 
4See TWU letter dated October 10, 2001; see also Comsewogue Union Free 
Sch. Dist, 27 PERB H3047 (1994). 
525 PERB 1J3064 (1992). 
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In reaching his decision, the Director relied upon our prior holding in Local 589, 
International Association of Firefighters,6 which was illustrative of the extraordinary 
circumstances that may give rise to a contract repudiation. Here, both parties point to 
the collective bargaining agreement as support for their respective positions. Neither 
has deniedJhe_existence_ofLan agreement; theiridisagreement is over the interpretation 
and effect of certain terms of the agreement. 
Since it cannot be said from the facts before the Director that TWU has 
repudiated the collective bargaining agreement, we are, therefore, constrained by the 
Act from exercising jurisdiction over the parties' contract dispute which does not 
otherwise give rise to a violation of the Act. 
Based upon the foregoing, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the charge be, and 
hereby is, dismissed in its entirety. 
DATED: February 28, 2002 
Albany, New York 
jael R. Cuevas, Chairman 
Marc A. Abbott, Member 
/ / I nhn T Mi tnho l l M o m h o r 
U" "" """" 
Supra, note 1. 
') STATE OF NEW YORK PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
CITY OF NEW ROCHELLE, 
Charging Party, 
- and - CASE NO. D-0271 
UNIFORMED FIRE FIGHTERS ASSOCIATION 
INC., LOCAL 273 of the INTERNATIONAL 
ASSOCIATION OF FIRE FIGHTERS, AFL-CIO, 
ERNEST HORNEY, individually and in his 
capacity as President of UFFA Local 273; 
BYRON GRAY, individually and in his capacity 
as Vice President of UFFA Local 273; MATTHEW 
AMOROSO, individually and in his capacity as 
Secretary/Treasurer of UFFA Local 273; PHILIP 
CICCHIELLO, individually and in his capacity 
as a Trustee of UFFA Local 273; MICHAEL 
BARTHOLOMEW, individually and in his 
capacity as a Trustee of UFFA Local 273, 
Respondents. . 
VINCENT TOOMEY, ESQ., for Charging Party 
MEYER, SUOZZI, ENGLISH & KLEIN, P.C. (RICHARD S. 
CORENTHAL of counsel), for Respondent 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
On December 28, 2001, the City of New Rochelle (City) filed a charge which 
alleged that the Uniformed Fire Fighters Association, Inc., Local 273 of the International 
Association of Fire Fighters, AFL-CIO, et al. (Association) had violated §210.1 of the 
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Public Employees' Fair Employment Act (Act) in that it engaged in a strike against the 
City on each of four Saturdays during the month of December 2001, as well as on 
Christmas Eve and Christmas Day. The ALJ found that, pursuant to §206.5(d) of the 
Rules of Procedure (Rules), the Association's failure to file an Answer within the time 
provided in §206.5(a) of the Rules constituted an admission of the material facts 
alleged in the charge and an admission that the Association had violated §210.1 of the 
Act. 
At the hearing on February 14, 2002, the parties entered into a stipulation of 
settlement, which provided, in pertinent part, that the City was withdrawing the charge 
against the individually-named union officers and trustees; that the respondent 
Association violated §210 of the Act; that the City and the Association have agreed to 
resolve numerous pending labor disputes; and that the stipulation of settlement is 
conditioned upon the Board's acceptance of the facts and the proposed settlement set 
forth therein. 
Based upon the ALJ's findings and the stipulation of settlement, we find the 
Association violated §210.1 of the Act in that it engaged in a strike as charged. We 
further find that the public inconvenience was limited to the financial impact of calling in 
additional firefighters on overtime; that the parties are now attempting to repair their 
damaged labor relationship; and that, as there is no evidence that the Association has 
previously engaged in any strike activity, a suspension of the dues and agency shop fee 
deductions of six (6) months is a reasonable one and will effectuate the policies of the 
Act. 
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IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the dues and agency shop fee deduction 
privileges of the Association, be suspended commencing at the first practicable date 
and continuing for a period of six (6) months. Thereafter, no dues nor agency shop fee 
shall be deducted from the salaries of the unit members of the Association until the 
Association affirms that it no long 
as required by the provisions of §210.3(g) of the Act. 
DATED: February 28, 2002 
Albany, New York 
Michael R. Cuevas, Chairman 
•^IASJ^ACUJ1^^**"^. 
